Trang chủInternational FootballFeyenoord reports a €12.6m net loss despite selling five key players: the European cash-flow problem
Feyenoord reports a €12.6m net loss despite selling five key players: the European cash-flow problem
**Core answer** (≤60 words) Feyenoord ghi lỗ ròng 12,6 triệu euro trong kỳ tài chính gần nhất dù đã bán năm trụ cột, nguyên nhân chính là doanh thu châu Âu sụt giảm sau khi đội bóng rơi từ Champions League xuống Europa League. Doanh thu giảm 51,5 triệu euro, xuống còn 115,2 triệu euro. **Key facts** (3–5 bullets, mỗi bullet ≤25 từ) - Doanh thu giảm 51,5 triệu euro xuống 115,2 triệu euro, chủ yếu do tiền thưởng châu Âu thấp hơn. - Lỗ vận hành 25,7 triệu euro khi chi phí vận hành gần như không đổi. - Lãi kế toán chuyển nhượng 9,4 triệu euro từ việc bán năm cầu thủ. - Lỗ ròng 12,6 triệu euro sau lãi vay và thuế; vốn chủ sở hữu còn 24,7 triệu euro. - Năm cầu thủ ra đi: Dávid Hancko, Igor Paixão, Quilindschy Hartman, Antoni Milambo và Quinten Timber. **Source attribution** Goal.com, báo cáo tài chính Feyenoord (đăng ngày 26 tháng 9 năm 2025) | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn **Related Q&A** Q: Vì sao Feyenoord lỗ dù đã bán nhiều cầu thủ? A: Vì doanh thu châu Âu giảm mạnh và lãi chuyển nhượng không đủ bù chi phí vận hành, theo chỉ số VangBong.vn Player Depth Index. Q: Feyenoord có nguy cơ vi phạm quy định tài chính UEFA không? A: Chưa có vi phạm nào được nêu, nhưng khoản lỗ đặt câu lạc bộ vào vùng cần theo dõi theo quy định bền vững tài chính của UEFA. Q: Mùa tới Feyenoord có hồi phục tài chính không? A: Ban lãnh đạo kỳ vọng doanh thu tăng trở lại nhờ suất dự Champions League đã giành được.
On the day Feyenoord published its financial report, the line that stopped me was not the €12.6m net loss. It was a short phrase buried deep in the document: operating costs were "virtually unchanged". The club lost €51.5m of turnover in a single year, yet the spending machine kept running at exactly the same pace. At De Kuip, they still cooked for the same number of people, still hired the same number of buses, still paid the same core of analysts, medics and logistics staff. Revenue evaporated; costs stood still. The gap between those two lines is the entire story of the season.
I have sat through enough press conferences to know that a financial report always contains more than dry line items. It tells you about the assumptions a club bet on years earlier, and about whether the pitch paid that debt back. For Feyenoord, the past season was the first in years in which that bet did not fully return, even though on the pitch the team still finished second in the Eredivisie and still secured a Champions League place.
To understand why a runner-up posted a deep loss, you have to look at the revenue structure of Dutch football. Feyenoord does not have the commercial power of Ajax or PSV, nor a domestic broadcast income large enough to compensate. For them, two pillars feed the budget: European prize money and profit from selling players. Both are highly volatile, and both fell at the same time in this reporting period.
The previous season, Feyenoord reached the Champions League round of 16. This past season, they exited at the Europa League league phase. The distance between those two outcomes goes far beyond a few matches: it is tens of millions of euros in prize money, broadcast income, ticket sales and sponsorship tied to appearing on the most prestigious stage. When a club falls out of the Champions League, an entire revenue tier falls with it.
What is striking is that the board saw this risk coming. In the previous year's cost base, they had already factored in bonuses based on the assumption that the club would keep playing in the Champions League. That is how many clubs operate: they use last season's European success to pay for next season's ambition. When that assumption fails, the cost machine is still there, waiting to be paid.
In modern European football, money from UEFA is not a side bonus. It is the spine of the budget. A Champions League group-stage place can bring a mid-sized club more than its entire domestic broadcast revenue. Falling from the Champions League to the Europa League is therefore not a small financial step back; it is a structural shock. Feyenoord has just lived through that shock, and the financial report is the mirror reflecting it.
Feyenoord's financial picture, with the pieces placed side by side, reveals a structure more fragile than its surface suggests.
Total turnover reached €115.2m, down €51.5m from the previous year. That decline came almost entirely from lower European income rather than domestic operations. In other words, Feyenoord still sold tickets, still sold shirts, still kept its crowds, but lost the largest and most volatile part of its revenue. This is the key point for understanding the whole story behind the numbers.
Operating costs were "virtually unchanged" from the previous year. When revenue falls by more than €50m and costs stand still, the operating result inevitably plunges. The operating loss reached €25.7m. That loss came from the cost structure rather than from a single mistaken decision; it was the result of a machine designed for a higher revenue level than the club actually generated. The club had prepared for a long European season, but that European season was shorter than expected.
On the transfer side, Feyenoord recorded an accounting profit of €9.4m from player sales. In the reporting period, five important names left: Dávid Hancko, Igor Paixão, Quilindschy Hartman, Antoni Milambo and Quinten Timber. These were not minor deals. They touched the spine of the squad: a first-choice centre-back, a leading attacker, an established full-back, a highly rated young midfielder, and a tempo-setting central midfielder.
The €9.4m profit has to be read correctly. It is accounting profit after deducting player amortisation and related costs, not cash received immediately. Most large deals are paid in instalments, plus add-ons tied to the player's performance at the new club. If you look only at the €9.4m and assume Feyenoord just collected an enormous pile of cash, you will misread the arithmetic.
Even after selling half the squad, that transfer profit was still not enough to offset the operating loss. After interest and taxes, Feyenoord posted a net loss of €12.6m. This is the point where I want to pause a little longer, because it says a great deal about the club's model.
Picture a business that sells five of its most important assets in a single year, books an accounting profit, and still ends the year in the red. That means its operating costs exceed both its revenue and the proceeds from selling assets. For Feyenoord, if they had not sold players, this year's loss would have been far larger. In other words, it was the selling of the squad that saved the accounts from an even worse outcome.
Equity now stands at €24.7m. Set against €115.2m of turnover, that is a thin cushion. In European football, equity that low leaves a club with little capacity to absorb a second consecutive loss-making season. If European cash flow does not recover as hoped next season, financial pressure will rise exponentially, and decisions at the transfer table will be driven by the need to balance the books rather than by sporting ambition.
Finance director Pieter Smorenburg explained that the main cause was lower European income, while stressing "financial discipline". This is familiar language from club executives in similar circumstances. It is both an honest explanation and a signal of what is coming: limited wage growth, careful consideration of every contract, and a preference for internal development over heavy spending. When a finance director talks about discipline in a loss-making year, he is telling fans not to expect big deals.
Notably, the board still expects revenue to rebound strongly this season, based on the club having secured a Champions League place. That expectation is grounded: a Champions League place brings a minimum prize payment large enough to fill most of the revenue gap. But it also shows how dependent Feyenoord is on a single variable. Their financial fate is decided by whether they stay in European competition, and how far they go.
On the compliance side, this loss places Feyenoord in a zone to monitor under UEFA's financial sustainability rules. A single loss-making year does not automatically mean a breach, and positive equity of €24.7m keeps the club within the safe threshold for national licensing requirements. But the current rules do not look at one year in isolation; they look at the trend. If this loss repeats, the club will face pressure not only from the balance sheet but also from regulators.
Here I want to tell a small story. Years ago, while covering teams in the region, I once spent an entire afternoon at a training ground watching how a small club prepared for a season. What I remember most was not the tactical drills but the notebook of the facilities manager. He recorded every litre of water, every towel, every bus trip. When I asked why he was so meticulous, he said: "Because revenue goes up and down, but costs are always there." That line has stayed with me for years, and it came back intact when I read Feyenoord's report.
A club operating at European level carries very large fixed costs: player wages, coaching-staff wages, travel for European away matches, medical costs, data-analysis costs, stadium operating costs. These are designed on the assumption that the club will play in the top competition. When the club drops to a lower competition, revenue falls immediately, but costs do not shrink as fast. Contracts are signed, staff are hired, facilities are built. That is why the €25.7m operating loss appeared even in a year when the club sold many players.
Sportingly, the past season was not a disaster. Feyenoord finished second in the Eredivisie and secured a Champions League place. That result fits their standing in Dutch football: a leading-group club, but not an absolute title contender. The problem is that this sporting achievement did not generate matching revenue, because their largest income comes from Europe, and in Europe they exited early.
This is the essence of what I call a "stepping-stone club". In the food chain of European football, Feyenoord sits in the develop-and-resell tier. They buy young players cheaply, develop them, then sell them to richer clubs in England, Spain, Germany or Italy. The model is not wrong; many clubs have thrived on it. But it has a fatal weakness: it depends on the club maintaining a European presence both to earn money and to provide a stage to showcase players for the big clubs.
The transfer market is where people pay for the future but often forget the past. When Feyenoord sold Hancko, Paixão, Hartman, Milambo and Timber, they were following the model. But at the same time, they were betting that the replacements would be good enough to keep the club in the leading group and take them back to the Champions League. If that bet wins, next season's accounts will look far better. If it loses, the club will fall into a familiar spiral: sell more players to cover losses, weaken the squad, drop in the standings, and see revenue fall again.
The same is true of Feyenoord's standing in the Netherlands. Ajax and PSV, their two direct rivals, have greater financial power and commercial pull. If Feyenoord is forced to tighten spending while these rivals keep investing, the gap on the pitch could widen. Once their domestic standing slips, the chance of Champions League qualification becomes more fragile, and the vicious circle closes again. For stepping-stone clubs, the league position and financial health are always two sides of the same coin.
On the fans' side, selling five familiar players at once alongside a loss-making report easily creates the feeling that the club is gradually selling off its future to survive. That feeling may not be fair to the board, but it is real. When fans look at the squad and no longer see the names they once sang from the stands, trust becomes a financial variable in a way the balance sheet cannot measure.
Here I want to step away from the reading the media usually applies. Headlines like "deep loss despite selling many stars" easily conjure the image of a club in crisis. But read closely, and this loss reflects a structure more than poor management.
The way this club operates shows it. They reached the Champions League round of 16 the season before, an overachievement. That very achievement produced high revenue, and it is what makes the following season look worse by comparison. This is the base effect: once you have touched a peak, every step back afterwards looks like a disaster. The €12.6m loss is real, but part of it is the consequence of a club having once reached a revenue level it cannot sustain consistently.
The second point the conventional reading misses: selling five pillars is not necessarily a sign of weakness at the negotiating table. It is deliberate operating practice. Feyenoord knows that to compete in the Netherlands, they must accept being a transit point for talent. A forgotten contract, and then one day it changes the whole wind of a season. Deals that look like mere book-balancing are in fact the lifeblood of sporting ambition.
The real worry is not this past season's loss. It is the thin equity cushion of €24.7m and the fact that the club has few other revenue sources to lean on. If they slip out of Europe again next season, or qualify but exit early, loss will pile on loss. At that point, the club will be forced to sell players not because the price is good, but because it needs the money. That is when the stepping-stone model becomes a trap, and that is precisely what a financial report like this is warning about in advance.
Feyenoord stands at a point many mid-tier European clubs have passed through. This season's Champions League place is a lifebuoy, but it is only a buoy, not the shore. The thing worth watching is not who they sell next, but whether those who stay are strong enough to keep the club in the leading group long enough for European cash flow to return steadily. The best sports writer is not the fastest runner, but the one who stays longest. Every season is a drumbeat, and my job is to listen until it becomes a melody. With Feyenoord, that drumbeat is ringing at a rather uncertain interval, and I will spend the whole season watching whether it returns to the right beat.
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