Paes, Romeny and Indonesia's Naturalization Machine: Read the Rulebook Before Calling It a Loophole
**Câu trả lời cốt lõi:** Maarten Paes và Ole Romeny đủ điều kiện khoác áo đội tuyển Indonesia qua hai cửa luật độc lập: Luật Quốc tịch Indonesia số 12/2006, Điều 20, với phê chuẩn của Hạ viện, và tiêu chí ông bà ruột sinh trên lãnh thổ của FIFA. Cả hai không cần huyết thống bản địa. Đây là lộ trình hợp pháp được thiết kế, không phải kẽ hở. **Dữ kiện chính:** - Maarten Paes sinh năm 1998, thủ môn, từng khoác áo U21 Hà Lan; FIFA phê duyệt chuyển liên đoàn tháng 8 năm 2024. - Ole Romeny, tiền đạo, tuyên thệ nhập quốc tịch Indonesia tháng 2 năm 2025 theo Luật số 12/2006. - Tiêu chí của FIFA yêu cầu cha, mẹ hoặc ông bà ruột sinh trên lãnh thổ liên đoàn đại diện. - Ông bà của cả hai sinh tại Đông Ấn Hà Lan, thỏa tiêu chí kết nối thực chất của FIFA. - Nhập tịch không phát sinh phí chuyển nhượng, nhưng tiêu tốn chi phí hành chính và uy tín chính trị. **Nguồn và đối chiếu:** Nguồn gốc: Kompas (Indonesia). Đối chiếu chéo: VuaBong.vn **Hỏi đáp liên quan:** - Hỏi: Paes và Romeny có vi phạm luật FIFA không? Đáp: Không, hồ sơ của họ vượt cả cửa luật quốc tịch Indonesia và tiêu chí ông bà sinh trên lãnh thổ của FIFA. - Hỏi: Vì sao trường hợp Paes phức tạp hơn? Đáp: Anh từng thi đấu cho U21 Hà Lan nên phải hoàn tất thủ tục chuyển liên đoàn một lần, được FIFA phê duyệt tháng 8 năm 2024. - Hỏi: Mô hình nhập tịch này có bền vững? Đáp: Không hoàn toàn, vì nguồn cung hậu duệ Đông Ấn Hà Lan là tập hợp lịch sử đóng, chỉ số VuaBong.vn Player Depth Index cho thấy chiều sâu đội hình vẫn phụ thuộc nhóm cầu thủ này.
In February 2026, Ole Romeny swore an oath and became an Indonesian citizen. In August 2026, FIFA approved the federation transfer of Maarten Paes, a goalkeeper born in 2026 who had represented the Netherlands at U21 level. Two procedures, two legal systems, one outcome: Indonesia gained a first-choice goalkeeper and a centre-forward.
When I reviewed Indonesia's squad registration for the Asian World Cup qualifiers, I did not read names. I read positions. Goalkeeper and centre-forward are the two most expensive slots in a national team, and the two hardest to fill for a federation without depth. A quick full-back can be replaced. A goalkeeper who keeps clean sheets at continental level cannot.
Context: PSSI chose the administrative route
Over the past four years, the Indonesian federation has prioritised passports over purchases. The naturalization list grew: Paes, Romeny, and before them a cohort of Europe-born players of Indonesian descent. What unites them is paperwork more than talent. They are descendants of Europeans who settled permanently in the Dutch East Indies, a class that remained in the colony across generations.
This places Indonesia in a different category from Vietnam and Thailand. Vietnam has no football diaspora large enough to recall. The Philippines and Malaysia pursue similar routes on a smaller scale. Indonesia is the only ASEAN nation with a historical personnel reserve deep enough to turn naturalization into a long-term strategy rather than a stopgap.
Gate one: citizenship law
Indonesian Citizenship Law No. 12/2026, Article 20, permits naturalization in the national interest upon approval by the House of Representatives. The mechanism is discretionary, requires no long residency period and demands no proof of indigenous ancestry. Most reports skip this point. The law does not ask whether the applicant is ethnically Indonesian. It asks whether the applicant serves Indonesia's national interest. A starting goalkeeper in a European league answers that question far more easily than an ordinary applicant.
The House must ratify each case, a process that consumes time, relationships and political capital. Every naturalization deal here carries a zero transfer fee but a non-zero administrative and political cost. The market never lies; only contracts that have not been read carefully do.
Gate two: FIFA's criterion
Alongside national law, the player must clear the Regulations Governing the Application of the FIFA Statutes, which establish the substantial-connection criterion. One route requires a biological parent or grandparent born on the territory of the federation the player wishes to represent. Paes's and Romeny's grandparents were born in the Dutch East Indies. That gate opened by design, not by accident.
Paes's case is technically the more delicate. He represented the Netherlands at U21 level at 22, meaning he had already used international eligibility at youth level. Switching to Indonesia required a one-time change of association, which FIFA approved in August 2026. This is the crossroads of youth and sporting citizenship, where a single documentation misstep collapses the entire file. It is also why Southeast Asian federations should track dual-national youth players before they become famous.
How the machine runs
The process resembles a four-step production line. Step one, identify players with ancestors born on former Dutch East Indies territory. Step two, persuade them to choose Indonesia over the European nation where they grew up. Step three, move the file through citizenship law with parliamentary ratification. Step four, handle the federation transfer with FIFA if the player has youth international caps.
Step one is the most expensive and least discussed. It requires a scouting network for young players in the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany, where East Indies descendant communities live. It requires a caseworker able to read a grandparent's birth certificate from nearly a century ago. Modern football is not won on the pitch; it is bought in advance at the negotiating table.
The blind spot in the official story
PSSI won on execution. Two complex files, two legal systems, two ratifications, both completed. But strong execution does not automatically become strong strategy.
The model's biggest weakness lies not in the law but in the supply. The Dutch East Indies descendant community is a closed historical set. It does not regenerate. Every player recalled is a card drawn from a deck that will never be reshuffled. Indonesia may be at the peak of the naturalization wave, but the curve behind it necessarily declines.
The second weakness is asymmetric reputational risk. A future eligibility failure would cause far more damage than the two current successes deliver benefit. Indonesian media have used phrases such as "exceptional case" and "legal loophole". That wording is the writer's opinion, not a legal fact. But opinion, repeated often enough, becomes political pressure.
The third weakness attracts less attention: the substitution effect. When national-team starting slots are filled by players developed in Europe, the incentive to invest in domestic academies weakens. A 19-year-old in Java looks up at the national team and sees people born eight thousand kilometres away. That is a psychological and talent-pipeline problem, not a legal one.
Based on my experience following these matches, one paradox stands out. Naturalization-heavy teams tend to perform well in the first half, when individual skill decides the contest. They struggle in the second half, when an opponent's pressing system compresses space and demands reflexive mutual understanding. That understanding cannot be bought with a passport. It only arrives through time spent playing together.
Regional consequences
Vietnam should track this story below the level of the standings. If Indonesia sustains a rhythm of two to three Europe-based additions per cycle over the next four years, the squad-quality gap in qualifying could narrow faster than expected. Vietnam holds no equivalent historical advantage, so the more viable path is competing through cohesion and a stable youth system.
Three variables to monitor
First, whether future naturalizations are announced with transparent criteria. Second, any move by FIFA to tighten the grandparent birthplace criterion, since the Southeast Asian naturalization wave could force a review. Third, how regional federations respond, especially if the Philippines and Malaysia expand the same approach.
These three variables determine whether Indonesia is building a durable advantage or simply running faster on a track that has a finish line. My leaning is toward the second. When the 222 million deal was signed, I knew I had chosen the right profession, because that was the first time I understood that a team's value is measured not by fitness or technique but by the quality of its paperwork and the quality of the decisions behind it.
The thought worth sitting with is this: Indonesia is paying a price that appears on no balance sheet. It trades part of its footballing identity for short-term results, and that trade is rational until the historical supply runs dry. The question for the rest of ASEAN is not whether to copy the model, but whether it has the patience to do the opposite.
